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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 Jeanette Spear and the Estate of her late husband, Leon 
Spear, ("taxpayers") appeal the decision of the United States Tax 
Court assessing substantial income tax deficiencies and fraud 
penalties against them following a five-day trial.  The tax 
court's decision depends in significant measure on "deemed" facts 
resulting from a sanction imposed because of Jeanette Spear's 
failure to appear and testify at trial.  These deemed facts were 
critical to the outcome because they not only furnished the 
predicate for use by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") of the 
net worth method to determine income tax liability, but also 
appear to have shifted the burden of proof on both net worth and 
fraud from the IRS to the taxpayer. 
 The tax court imposed this quite severe sanction 
notwithstanding that it had before it a five-hour long videotaped 
deposition of Jeanette Spear taken for possible use at trial 
 
 
which covered all the ground of reasonably expected trial 
testimony.  Moreover, the ultimate basis for imposition of the 
sanction, Jeanette Spear's putative bad faith in failing to 
appear at trial, is based on such a frail foundation that the tax 
court's bad faith finding does not survive even deferential 
review.  Given these considerations, and the fact that the other 
factors that we consider in applying the principles used to 
assess the validity of sanctions favor the taxpayers, we conclude 
that the sanction imposed here was improper and an abuse of 
discretion.  We will therefore vacate the tax court's decision 
and remand for further proceedings.   
 
 I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A.  Background 
 During the years in question, taxpayers were the sole 
shareholders in several corporations which operated a large 
number of parking lots in Center City Philadelphia on the fringe 
of the downtown area.  The IRS contends that taxpayers skimmed 
money from these cash businesses and failed to report it as 
income.  The IRS based its assessment of deficiencies on the net 
worth method, under which it determined income by subtracting 
taxpayers' net worth at the end of the tax year from their net 
worth at the beginning of the tax year with appropriate 
adjustment for nontaxable receipts and nondeductible 
expenditures.  The IRS often uses this method when the taxpayers' 
income and expense records are inadequate or incomplete.   
 
 
 In 1986, the IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency to 
taxpayers assessing income tax deficiencies of $51,271.70, 
$157,706.46 and $93,536.23 for the years 1975, 1976 and 1977 
respectively.  The Notice also asserted fraud penalties of 
$25,635.85, $78,853.23 and $46,768.12 for the same years.  JA 27-
33.  Taxpayers sought a redetermination of these assessments in 
tax court.  On October 31, 1989, Leon Spear suffered a stroke and 
died soon thereafter.  The tax court substituted the Estate of 
Leon Spear as a defendant.   
 The taxpayers contended at trial that: 1) the IRS had 
inappropriately used the net worth method because they had kept 
adequate records of their income; 2) the source of the funds that 
led to the large increase in their net worth was $380,000 in cash 
that Leon Spear's father had given to him years earlier which had 
been kept in safe deposit boxes, so that taxpayers' net worth at 
the beginning of the 1975 was far higher than the IRS believed; 
and 3) the parking lots could not have produced sufficient income 
to account for the increase in net worth the IRS claimed.  The 
tax court rejected these contentions and concluded that there 
were tax deficiencies of $43,354.65, $155,504.29 and $92,053.20 
for 1975, 1976 and 1977.  It also imposed fraud penalties of 
$21,677.32, $77,752.14 and $46,026.60 for the same years. 
 Although taxpayers repeat on appeal their contentions 
about the use of the net worth method, and challenge the factual 
findings pertaining to net worth as clearly erroneous, they also 
strenuously argue that the court committed reversible error by 
sanctioning them for Jeanette Spear's failure to testify.  The 
 
 
sanction was a linchpin of the tax court's decision, and we limit 
our discussion of the record to the facts bearing on the 
sanctions issue. 
 
 B.  The Facts Leading to the Imposition of Sanctions 
 In April 1990, the tax court entered an order setting 
the case for trial on November 9, 1990.  JA 5.  The IRS 
subpoenaed Jeanette to appear at trial because she was the only 
living witness to the alleged 1957 gift of $380,000 from Leon's 
father, and because she had been responsible for maintaining the 
books of the parking corporations.  JA 923-24. 
 On October 25, 1990, taxpayers moved for a continuance 
on the basis that Jeanette was experiencing emotional trauma 
based on the anniversary of her husband's death (a death she 
attributed to the prosecution by the IRS, JA 11-12) and the 
approach of the trial.  On November 2, 1990, Dr. Sol B. 
Barenbaum, a psychologist chosen by the Commissioner, examined 
Jeanette and reported that she could testify without mental or 
physical harm.  JA 10-13, 124-25.  However, on November 5, 1990, 
Jeanette was admitted to the psychiatric unit of Nazareth 
Hospital in Philadelphia after her attending physician, Dr. 
Martin J. Durkin, was told that she had attempted suicide by gas 
and possibly pills.  JA 16, 125.  
 Taxpayers then moved for a continuance, attaching a 
letter from Dr. Durkin, who is a Board-certified psychiatrist, 
stating that Jeanette was suffering from "psychotic depression 
and a recent serious suicide attempt" and that she needed to be 
 
 
hospitalized for at least two or three weeks.  JA 14.  The tax 
court granted the continuance on November 6.  JA 7.  The next day 
Jeanette's son, Robert Spear, requested that she be released from 
the hospital.  The hospital allowed her out for the day on 
November 9, 10, and 11, and discharged her on November 12.  JA 
143-44. 
 Dr. Durkin evaluated Jeanette again in December 1990, 
and January, March and April, 1991.  (JA 15-18).  On March 18, 
Dr. Durkin wrote to defense counsel that after three psychiatric 
evaluations of Jeanette he had concluded that  
 
 [s]he continues to suffer from a depressive 
illness with features of anxiety.  I do not 
feel it wise to expose the patient to a 
judicial process in respect to her concerns 
with the Federal Government.  This type of 
exposure could exacerbate her present illness 
and possibly lead to another suicide attempt.  
The stress could be a precipitating event to 
a possible heart attack or stroke.   
J.A. 15.  On April 29, after conducting still another psychiatric 
evaluation, Dr. Durkin again wrote to defense counsel.  He stated 
that based on his continuing personal evaluation of Jeanette 
combined with the evaluation of a neurologist and a recreational 
therapist who observed Jeanette and conducted several tests 
during her hospitalization, his  
 opinion remains that the patient should not 
be exposed to depositions or to 
interrogatories  because of her present 
gradual emotional status.  To again 
summarize, I believe that any type of 
exposure to these types of events would 
exacerbate her depression and again cause a 
psychiatric hospitalization.  Worse, the 
 
 
patient may again make an attempt at suicide 
which could be successful.   
JA 18.  
 There is no evidence that, after this April evaluation,  
Jeanette had any further treatment until the next time the case 
was set for trial.  See T.C. Mem. Op. at 23.  In July, 1991, the 
Commissioner sought leave to take a videotaped deposition of 
Jeanette, arguing that such a deposition was needed due to 
Jeanette's possible unavailability for trial as a result of "her 
mental, emotional or physical infirmity."  JA 105.  Taxpayers 
opposed the application, submitting the April letter from Dr. 
Durkin quoted above, in which Dr. Durkin noted Jeanette's 
obsession with the trial and that she suffered from transitional 
stress due to her difficulties with the IRS.  JA 18.  
 On August 8, 1991, the IRS moved for a court-ordered 
physical and mental examination to determine Jeanette's ability 
to testify.  Taxpayers opposed the application, submitting 
another letter from Dr. Durkin stating that a forced examination 
or appearance in a court would "be a serious danger to Mrs. 
Spear," JA 21, and pointing out that Jeanette had previously 
undergone a court ordered examination.  Taxpayers also submitted 
an affidavit from Dr. Marvin Rubin, a psychologist who had 
treated Jeanette from November 15, 1989 through October 24, 1990, 
stating that: 
 
 [w]hether correctly or incorrectly Jeanette 
attributes the death of her husband to the 
fear and anxiety that he had relating to the 
Internal Revenue Service hearing.  Jeanette 
is very anxious and upset about the 
 
 
possibility of herself dying at the hearing.  
It is my professional opinion that Jeanette 
is incapable presently to withstand the 
trauma of a court hearing due to her 
emotional and psychological state.  Add in 
the fact that the anniversary of her 
husband's death is imminent, the effect would 
psychologically devastating. 
 
J.A.  11-12. 
 
  The court denied the motion for a videotaped deposition 
but granted the motion for a physical and mental examination.  
Taxpayers refused to have Jeanette appear for the examination and 
the Commissioner moved for sanctions.  See T.C. Mem. Op. at 24.   
Taxpayers then decided that it was preferable for Jeanette to 
appear for the videotaped deposition than the physical 
examination.  JA 165.  On November 13, 1991, the court ordered 
Jeanette to appear for the videotaped deposition and scheduled 
briefing on the sanctions motion. 
 On December 12, 1991, the IRS deposed Jeanette (on 
videotape) for more than five hours.  In taxpayers' submission, 
they gave the IRS great leeway in questioning, objecting only 
eight times and not asking any follow up questions in order not 
to elevate Jeanette's level of stress.  The taxpayers contend 
that Jeanette was distressed and confused at times during the 
deposition; the IRS asserts that she showed that she could 
testify coherently and knowledgeably.   Compare JA 650, 764-65, 
807, 814 with JA 638-40, 659-63, 736-38, 750-52.  At the 
conclusion of the deposition, IRS counsel asked that the 
transcript be marked for use at trial.  JA 921.  After the 
deposition, the court granted the IRS' motion to withdraw its 
 
 
request for sanctions and denied the IRS' motion for a competency 
hearing as moot.  JA 185.  
 The IRS subpoenaed Jeanette to appear as a witness at 
trial.  On February 17, 1992, taxpayers notified IRS counsel that 
Jeanette would not appear at trial because doing so would 
endanger her health and because the IRS had taken her videotaped 
deposition two months earlier.  The Commissioner moved to compel 
Jeanette to testify or for sanctions.  On February 20, the tax 
court held a hearing at which the Commissioner's counsel offered 
to limit Jeanette's testimony to one or two hours and to "hold it 
in an atmosphere similar to that of a deposition."  JA 8, 835-36, 
921, 926, 929.  Taxpayers did not accept this arrangement, and 
the court ordered Jeanette to appear and testify on February 24.  
See T.C. Mem. Op. at 25.  
 Taxpayers requested that the court schedule an 
evidentiary hearing on February 25 for Dr. Durkin to testify 
about Jeanette's condition and thus to help the court understand 
why she could not testify.  JA 837, 920.  The court denied the 
request on the grounds that it would disrupt the trial schedule, 
see T.C. Mem. Op. at 24, although counsel offered to have Dr. 
Durkin testify before Jeanette's scheduled testimony so as not to 
disrupt the trial.  JA 930.  The court agreed to accept another 
affidavit from Dr. Durkin instead, stating "[i]f it's just a 
matter of effectiveness of presentation, oral versus writing, 
then I'm not going to have a hearing for that purpose."  JA 932. 
 On February 23, the day before she was to testify, 
Jeanette was again admitted to Nazareth Hospital.  According to 
 
 
the hospital records, the accuracy of which Dr. Durkin certified 
as the attending physician, Jeanette had a "major depressive 
affective disorder, recurrent episode, severe with psychotic 
behavior" and "unspecified acute reaction to stress."  JA 225.  
Dr. Durkin's admission note states that Jeanette cried frequently 
during the evaluation, had a hopeless demeanor, and had 
difficulty concentrating.  JA 232-33. Although her sons reported 
that she may have been abusing valium, laboratory tests did not 
show the presence of valium or any similar substances in her 
system.  JA 217, 232, 234-40, opinion at 26.  Jeanette did not 
appear in court on February 24 and the tax court granted the 
Commissioner's motion for sanctions.  JA 186, 1095. 
 On February 25, the day after she was supposed to 
testify, while the trial was still going on, Jeanette checked out 
of the hospital.  The taxpayers did not inform the court that 
Jeanette had done so (T.C. Mem. Op. at 26). 
 
 C.  The Sanctions Themselves 
 As a result of Jeanette's failure to testify, the tax 
court sanctioned the taxpayers by deeming the Commissioner to 
have "made a prima facie showing" of the allegations in paragraph 
7 of the Commissioner's answer, those dealing with net worth and 
fraud, JA 186, 1095-96 opinion at 33, and to have "met the burden 
of going forward as to those allegations.  This shifts the burden 
of going forward with evidence to petitioners to rebut 
respondent's allegations of fraud." T.C. Mem. Op. at 33.  
 
 
 Among the facts the court deemed to be true were that: 
(1) taxpayers had furnished only incomplete tax records to the 
IRS; (2) the IRS had determined correct taxable income for the 
years 1975-77 on the basis of the net worth method; (3) taxpayers 
did not have available any cash on hand as of December 31, 1974 
which was not deposited in one of their bank accounts; (4) 
taxpayers used unreported income to acquire eight real estate 
properties in their names or the name of a wholly owned nominee 
corporation used to conceal their real estate holdings, and also 
used unreported income for other expenditures; and (5) taxpayers 
understated their taxable income for the years 1975-77 with 
fraudulent intent. 
 In a net worth case, the Commissioner must: (1) 
establish with reasonable certainty an opening net worth; and (2) 
either (a) show a likely income source, or (b) negate possible 
nontaxable income sources.  Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 
132-38 (1954), T.C. Mem. Op. at 36.  By deeming the IRS to have 
established correct taxable income on the basis of the net worth 
method, the tax court appears to have shifted the burden of proof 
on this central aspect of the case.  T.C. Mem. Op. at 33 (holding 
for the IRS generally, the court stated that "[p]etitioners did 
not provide sufficient evidence to overcome these deemed facts").   
 That the imposition of sanctions may well have been 
critically important to the result is especially clear when 
considering the fraud counts.  The tax court did state that: 
 Respondent has the burden of proving fraud by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Sec. 7454(a); 
Rule 142(b).  First, respondent must prove 
 
 
the existence of an underpayment.  Parks v. 
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 660 (1990).  
Respondent may not rely upon the taxpayer's 
failure to carry the burden of proof as to 
the underlying deficiency.  Parks v. 
Commissioner, supra at 660-661; Petzholdt v. 
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 700 (1989); Estate 
of Beck v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 297, 363 
(1971).  Second, respondent must show that 
the taxpayer intended to evade taxes by 
conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or 
otherwise prevent tax collection.  Petzholdt 
at 699.  Stoltzfus v. United States, 398 F.2d 
1002, 1005 (3d Cir. 1968); Parks v. 
Commissioner, supra at 661; Rowlee v. 
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123 (1983). 
 
T.C. Mem. Op. at 55.  Yet the tax court seemed to enable the 
Commissioner to surmount this steep burden of proof by relying on 
the facts deemed to be true.  The court wrote: 
 On February 24, 1992, the Court imposed 
sanctions on petitioners because Jeanette 
Spear violated an order of the Court by 
unreasonably refusing to testify at trial.  
The Court ordered that respondent is deemed 
to have made a prima facie showing that the 
facts in paragraph seven of the amended 
answer (paragraph 7) are established.  
Petitioners did not convince us that any of 
the statements of facts in paragraph 7 are 
wrong.  As discussed below, we conclude the 
facts stated in paragraph 7 and the entire 
record in this case clearly and convincingly 
show that Leon and Jeanette Spear are liable 
for fraud for each year in issue. 
 
T.C. Mem. Op. at 55-56. 
 Despite these indications that the tax court switched 
the burden of proof as well as the burden of production, there 
are many other places in the opinion that make it appear that the 
tax court found sufficient evidence of net worth and of fraud 
without relying on the deemed facts.  Nonetheless, because we are 
 
 
unsure whether the court relied on these facts and shifted the 
burden of proof, and because the consequences to the taxpayers 
are so significant, we must assume that the court did rely on 
these facts.  We will thus treat the sanction as one that 
essentially shifted the burden of proof (and production) on net 
worth and on fraud. 
 We note that shifting the burden of proof on the fraud 
counts would be an even more severe sanction here than it would 
be ordinarily because the tax court relied on taxpayers' fraud to 
reject their statute of limitations defense.  See T.C. Mem. Op. 
at 62.  Fraud will defeat a statute of limitations defense, Sec. 
6501(c)(1), and if taxpayers had prevailed on the fraud count, 
they may well have had a valid statute of limitations defense.1  
See T.C. Mem. Op. at 62-63.  In sum, the sanction in this case 
was quite significant and may well have controlled the outcome.   
 
 II.  DISCUSSION  
 A.  The Applicable Sanctions Standard 
 T.C. Rule 104(c) as quoted in Gerling Intern. Ins. Co. 
v. C.I.R., 839 F.2d 131, 136 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988), provides in 
pertinent part that: 
 "If a party. . . fails to obey an order made 
by the court . . . the Court may make such 
orders as to the failure as are just and 
among others the following: 
  (1) An order that the matters regarding 
which the order was made or any other 
designated facts shall be taken to be 
                     
     1  The Tax Court did not reach this issue because it found 
fraud.   
 
 
established for the purposes of the case in 
accordance with the claim of the party 
obtaining the order. 
  
The rule is quite similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), and we 
construe them in pari materia.  We review the sanction of deeming 
facts to be true under an abuse of discretion standard.  See Ins. 
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 707, 
102 S. Ct. 2099, 2107 (1982); Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 957 (3d 
Cir. 1986).    
 In the context of discovery abuse, the Supreme Court 
has provided guidance on use of the sanction of deeming facts to 
be established.  In Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 707, 102 
S. Ct. at 2107, the Court explained that 
 Rule 37(b)(2) contains two standards -- one 
general and one specific -- that limit a 
district court's discretion.  First, any 
sanction must be `just'; second, the sanction 
must be specifically related to the 
particular `claim' which was at issue in the 
order to provide discovery. 
 
In that case the Court held that the district court had not 
abused its discretion in deeming facts establishing personal 
jurisdiction to be true absent proof to the contrary, because 
defendants had repeatedly agreed to comply with discovery orders 
and then failed to do so despite warnings that sanctions would 
result.  Ins. Corp. of Ireland at 707-09, 102 S. Ct. at 2107.  
The Court held that the second requirement, that the sanction be 
related to the claim at issue, was met because the sanctions took 




 This court has not elaborated on or applied the 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland standard.  In Ali, supra, we held that 
where a district court sanctioned defendants by deeming 
allegations in plaintiff's complaint to be admitted and granted 
summary judgment for plaintiff, the ruling was equivalent to a 
default judgment and thus required application of the standards 
we had set for issuing a sanction of dismissal.  See 788 F.2d at 
957.  More specifically, we held in Ali that, under the factors 
we had articulated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 
747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the sanctions constituted an abuse 
of discretion.  In Poulis we had explained that our review of a 
district court's dismissal with prejudice "is guided by the 
manner in which the trial court balanced [six] factors . . . and 
whether the record supports its findings."  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 
868.  The six factors are: 
 (1) the extent of the party's personal 
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary caused by the failure to meet 
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; 
(3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether 
the conduct of the party or the attorney was 
willful or in bad faith; (5) the 
effectiveness of sanctions other than 
dismissal which entails an analysis of 
alternative sanctions; and (6) the 
meritoriousness of the claim or defense. 
 
Id.    
 In Ali we applied these factors to reverse a sanction 
deeming certain facts to be true.  We held that, even if there 
was inexcusable delay by the defendants in that case, there was 
no bad faith, no history of dilatoriness, little prejudice from 
 
 
the delay that was caused, and less severe sanctions were 
probably available.  Under those circumstances, sanctions that 
were equivalent to dismissal constituted an abuse of discretion.  
Id. at 957-58.  We explained that, "[i]n Poulis, we established 
the strong presumption against sanctions that decide the issues 
of a case."  Id. at 958.2 
 Here, unlike in Ali, the tax court's sanction did not 
end the case.  At most the tax court deemed certain key facts 
admitted and reversed the burden of proof.  While this is a 
severe sanction, it is not the same as deeming allegations in a 
complaint to be admitted or granting a default judgment.  In 
Chilcutt v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth 
Circuit considered the standards for imposing a similar sanction 
(of deeming prima facie elements of the plaintiffs' liability 
claim to be established).  The court held that, although a 
court's decision to deem certain facts established may sometimes 
be equivalent to a default judgment, it was not equivalent where 
the sanctioned party (the government) was allowed to present its 
                     
     2  We have reviewed sanctions deeming facts to be 
established on only two other occasions, and in neither did we 
establish standards for determining whether the trial court 
abused its discretion.  In Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 
987, 998 (3d Cir. 1951), we held that where the government 
continued to refuse to produce documents based on a claim of 
privilege that had been overruled, the court was authorized by 
Rule 37 to deem the facts sought to be proved by the documents to 
be admitted -- but we did not consider whether the court had 
abused its discretion in applying such a sanction.  And in 
Gerling we held that a similar sanction was illegitimate because 
there had not been any discovery abuse -- thus, there was no 
question whether the court had abused its discretion in imposing 
sanctions for discovery abuse.  See Gerling, 839 F.2d at 139. 
 
 
case in chief and could have prevailed if it had established its 
contentions by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 1320 & 
n.18.  Thus, instead of imposing the sanction under the standards 
appropriate for a dismissal, the court applied the two standards 
of Insurance Corp. of Ireland (the requirement of "justness" and 
the requirement that the sanction be related to the particular 
claim at issue in the order to provide discovery) -- "along with 
a third -- that the sanction meet the Rule 37 goals of punishing 
the party which has obstructed discovery and deterring others who 
would otherwise be inclined to pursue similar behavior."  Id. at 
1321. 
 Because the sanction was not equivalent to default, for 
which a prerequisite under Fifth Circuit law is flagrant and 
willful disregard, the court suggested, in what it admitted to be 
dicta, that flagrant and willful disregard was not necessary.  
Id. at 1322 n.23.  On the facts of the case, the Chilcutt court 
upheld the sanction.  It stated that, where the district court 
had warned the government that it would issue sanctions and the 
government had repeatedly promised to be forthcoming, the 
plaintiffs had a colorable claim, and the evidence the government 
had hidden was relevant to the plaintiff's case, the sanction was 
just, related to the claim sought to be proved, and was necessary 
to compensate for non-compliance and to deter future violations.  
As for other considerations, the government's conduct was willful 
and was not solely the fault of its attorney.  Id. at 1321-25. 
 We agree with the Chilcutt court that cases on the 
sanction of dismissal are not automatically applicable to the 
 
 
sanction of deeming certain facts to be established.  
Nonetheless, the Poulis factors are relevant to evaluating such a 
sanction.  This is clear from the fact that, in evaluating 
whether a district court has properly exercised its discretion in 
imposing the sanction of exclusion of testimony, a sanction less 
harsh than dismissal and probably similar to shifting the burden 
of proof, we consider factors similar to those in Poulis.  See 
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d 
Cir. 1977).  We consider: 
 (1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the 
party against whom the excluded witnesses 
would have testified, (2) the ability of that 
party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent 
to which waiver of the rule against calling 
unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly 
and efficient trial of the case or of other 
cases in the court, and (4) bad faith or 
willfulness in failing to comply with the 
district court's order.   
 
Id.  Meyers and Poulis supply the sources of the standard we 
adopt here.   
 Comparing the Meyers factors with Poulis, Factor 4 goes 
to a party's culpability as do factors 1, 3, and 4 of the Poulis 
factors.  See supra at 16.  Factors 1 and 2 go to prejudice as 
does factor 2 of Poulis.  Factor 2 also goes to the ability to 
correct the problem with action less harsh than the sanction 
being considered as does factor 5 in Poulis.  Moreover, just as 
the ultimate Poulis calculus is a balancing, we think that 
balancing similar factors is appropriate in assessing a sanction 
of deeming established certain facts.  We apply a sliding scale -
- the harsher the sanction being imposed, the more the balance 
 
 
will have to be against the party being sanctioned to justify the 
sanction.  See  National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey 
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976) 
(dismissed); Society Internationale Pour Parcipations 
Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S. 
Ct. 1087, 1096 (1958) (dismissal); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp.,677 F.2d 339, 342-43 )3d Cir. 1982) (dismissal); 
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (exclusion of critical evidence). 
 This approach is consistent with the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion in Chilcutt.  Although the Chilcutt court held that the 
dismissal cases were not on point and that the test from  
Insurance Corp. of Ireland applied, the court referenced all of 
the factors we consider in dismissal cases.  It considered the 
culpability of the sanctioned party including whether the 
violation was solely the fault of the attorney or was also the 
fault of the client, and the effectiveness of alternative 
sanctions.  And while the court stated that willfulness was not 
required to impose a sanction of deeming facts proved (thus, 
incorporating our sliding scale theory of the appropriateness of 
sanctions), it also implied that willfulness was relevant.  It 
stated that "of course, the flagrancy of a party's behavior must 
be directly proportionate to the severity of the sanction 
imposed."  Chilcutt at 1322 n.23.3 
                     
     3.  Although the Chilcutt court also considered the role of 
the sanction in deterring future abuses, we need not consider 
that factor here since a deterrence analysis clearly does not fit 
 
 
 This approach is also consistent with Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland itself.  The standard articulated there, that a 
sanction must be 1) just and 2) specifically related to the 
particular `claim' which was at issue, was essentially a general 
standard for all Rule 37 sanctions.  Thus, like our opinion here, 
our opinions in Poulis and Meyers had to be consistent with 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland because they involved Rule 37 
sanctions.  They were consistent with it because they were an 
elaboration of the meaning of "just" and "related to the 
particular claim" in particular contexts.   
 In sum, in reviewing a trial court order deeming 
evidence admitted as a sanction for litigation misconduct, we 
will engage in a weighing and balancing exercise in which we 
consider: 1) culpability (including willfulness and bad faith, 
and whether the client was responsible or solely the attorney); 
2) prejudice; and 3) whether lesser sanctions would have been 
effective.   In making the actual balancing we utilize a sliding 
scale, so that bad faith, for example will have to be quite high 
to tip the balance if other factors strongly favor the taxpayers.  
We view this exercise to be a transliteration of the Insurance 
Corp. of Ireland standard in that the prejudice consideration 
subsumes the specific relatedness requirement, all of the factors 
of which essentially elaborate on "justness."  
 
                                                                  
the unusual facts of this case.  See our discussion of taxpayer's 
alleged bad faith infra at p. 24-30. 
 
 
 B.  Application of the Standard  
  1)  The Need to Show Bad Faith or Willfulness.  
 In the jurisprudence of dismissal, willfulness or bad 
faith is almost always required in order for dismissal to be 
within the proper scope of the court's discretion.  In the 
particular cases before it, the Supreme Court, at a minimum, has 
required some sort of fault for dismissal to be allowable.  
Compare Societe Internationale Pour Parcipations Industrielles et 
Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S. Ct. 1087, 1096 
(1958) (where party could not comply with discovery order due to 
Swiss law, dismissal was inappropriate.  It was "due to inability 
and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.") 
with National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976) ("[D]ismissal was 
appropriate in this case by reason of respondents' `flagrant bad 
faith' and their counsel's `flagrant disregard' of their 
responsibilities.").   
 Some courts have held that willfulness or bad faith is 
always required before dismissal is an acceptable sanction.  See 
Ford v. Fogarty Van Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1582, 1583 (11th Cir. 
1986) ("Absent a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by 
the plaintiff, the trial court's discretion is limited to the 
application of lesser sanctions [than dismissal]."); Wilson v. 
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977); 
Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 131 (S.D. 
Fla. 1987). But see United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins., 
Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (although government did 
 
 
not exhibit bad faith, dismissal was necessary to deter flagrant 
disobedience that resulted from understaffing). 
 Although we have held that dismissals are an extreme 
sanction reserved for cases comparable to National Hockey League 
where there was flagrant bad faith, see Poulis, 747 F.2d 863, 
867-68, we have sometimes upheld a court's sanction of dismissal 
even when there was no willfulness or bad faith.  See Poulis, 747 
F.2d at 868-70; cf. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 
1988) (not all Poulis factors have to be present for dismissal).  
Nonetheless, we generally have not upheld dismissal absent 
willfulness and bad faith.  See Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1982) (dismissal was an 
abuse of discretion where there was delay in obtaining local 
counsel but it was due to failure to move with dispatch rather 
than to bad faith, where the delay caused little prejudice to the 
defendant, and where the district court did not consider an 
alternative sanction).  Even with respect to the less extreme 
sanction of exclusion of evidence, we have held that with respect 
to critical evidence, "the exclusion of critical evidence is an 
`extreme' sanction, not normally to be imposed absent a showing 
of willful deception or `flagrant disregard' of a court order by 
the proponent of the evidence."  Meyers at 905 (quoting Dudley v. 
South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1977)). 
 Although, like the Chilcutt court, we do not have to 
decide the issue, we assume that, when the sanction of deeming 
facts to be true is not the equivalent of dismissal, willfulness 
and bad faith are not prerequisites for imposing that sanction.  
 
 
When a party does not provide information to another party to 
which that party is entitled, a court is certainly permitted to 
"even out" the proceedings by shifting the burden of proof in a 
fair way even in the absence of bad faith.  Moreover, in 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Supreme Court upheld a sanction 
of deeming facts to be established, even though the court had 
made no explicit finding of bad faith, finding repeated 
violations of discovery orders to constitute sufficient fault to 
justify the sanction. 
 Nonetheless, the presence of willfulness and bad faith 
certainly enhances the case for sanctions.  Shifting the burden 
of proof, as the tax court seems to have done here when it deemed 
certain facts to be established, is a fairly extreme sanction.  
It significantly changes the likely outcome at trial.  In the 
absence of willfulness or bad faith, other factors would have to 
weigh strongly in the favor of such a severe sanction to justify 
it.   
 
  2)  Did Jeanette's Conduct Constitute Bad Faith? 
 The tax court's decision to sanction taxpayers was 
essentially bottomed on its finding that Jeanette was 
deliberately attempting to avoid her testimonial duties.  The 
finding of bad faith was grounded upon the following:  1) 
Jeanette's illness and hospitalizations correlated with the time 
of her scheduled testimony; 2) the lack of evidence of illness at 
other times; 3)   the taxpayers' agreement to a deposition after 
the court ordered a mental and physical examination of Jeanette, 
 
 
while initially maintaining that Jeanette could not be deposed; 
4) Jeanette's competent answer to questions at her deposition, 
demonstrating a significant knowledge of the case;  5) taxpayers 
failure to timely inform the court that Jeanette could not 
testify (twice) or see a psychiatrist (once); and 6) taxpayers 
failure to inform the court that Jeanette had been released from 
the hospital until after the trial was over.  T.C. Mem. Op. at 
27-29. 
  A different explanation exists, however, for the 
correlation between the severity of Jeanette's illness and the 
imminence of court appearances (and the resultant tardiness of 
taxpayers informing the court that Jeanette could not testify) 
from the one that posits that the alleged illness was a tactic to 
avoid testifying.  A legitimate, medically grounded connection 
may have existed between Jeanette's illness and the imminence of 
court appearances.  In order to disbelieve this explanation (and 
believe that the correlation demonstrated that Jeanette was 
making up the illness to avoid court appearances), the tax court 
had to entirely discredit the evaluation of several physicians. 
 Dr. Durkin, a board-certified psychiatrist and 
apparently neutral witness who had never treated Jeanette prior 
to her admittance to the emergency room at Nazareth hospital, 
consistently diagnosed Jeanette as having a major depressive 
disorder, and did so upon Jeanette's admission to the hospital 
shortly before trial. He also maintained that this disorder was 
related to her difficulties with the IRS, and he stated on 
several occasions between November, 1991 and August, 1992, that 
 
 
testifying would pose a serious threat to Jeanette's health.  
JA15-JA18.  Dr. Durkin reached this conclusion based on several 
examinations of Jeanette, including examinations during a time 
when trial was not imminent.  Moreover, he based his opinion not 
only on his own evaluation but on that of a neurologist and a 
recreational therapist who had examined Jeanette during her first 
hospitalization.   
 Dr. Durkin's evaluation was corroborated by the 
affidavit of Dr. Rubin, who also concluded that Jeanette's 
illness was related to the legal proceedings.  JA11.  He stated 
that she attributed her husband's death to those proceedings and 
feared dying herself as a result of them.  He added that 
testifying would be psychologically devastating to her.  Like the 
tax court, these physicians were certainly aware of the 
possibility that Jeanette was feigning illness in order to avoid 
testifying, and yet they opined to the contrary.  The only doctor 
who concluded that Jeanette was capable of testifying did so 
before her first hospitalization.4 
 The tax court's other justifications for its findings 
also do not demonstrate bad faith.  The fact that taxpayers 
eventually agreed to allow Jeanette to be deposed does not show 
that their concern with her appearance at court proceedings was 
not genuine.  Taxpayers were faced with a choice of having 
Jeanette submit to a mental and physical examination, having her 
                     
     4 Dr. Sol B. Barenbaum, a psychologist chosen by the 
Commissioner, examined Jeanette on November 2, 1990. 
 
 
deposed, or facing a significant possibility of sanctions.  Their 
reluctant agreement to a deposition does not demonstrate a lack 
of concern that such a deposition would affect Jeanette's health. 
 We have viewed the videotape deposition which we 
describe infra at 32.  Although Jeanette broke down and cried and 
had to be soothed on several occasions, and seemed confused as to 
questions at others, she basically gave a lucid deposition 
without emotional breakdown, a factor that, as the tax court 
noted, would seem to undermine the doctors' conclusions that 
testifying would be emotionally devastating to her.5  But we are 
not physicians.  The deposition revealed Jeanette to be quite 
emotionally upset, and we cannot say with assurance that the fact 
that she was able to testify on one occasion automatically means 
that she could always do so.   
 Dr. Durkin continued to believe after this deposition 
(at the time of her second hospitalization) that Jeanette was 
suffering from a major depressive order.  And he reported that 
upon hospitalization "she indicated that she became quite anxious 
and quite upset when she discovered that the Internal Revenue 
Service wished her to be deposed for another hour period of time.  
She add[ed], `[t]hey have all that they can possibly get from me, 
what else are they looking for.'"  JA 232.  Thus, Jeanette's fear 
of the IRS may have escalated after the videotaped deposition.  
                     
     5On the other hand, if Jeanette gave a full and lucid 
deposition, that undermines the IRS's position that it was 




Moreover, although the IRS offered to make the conditions during 
Jeanette's trial testimony similar to those during her 
deposition, the judge's presence at trial would have added an 
intimidating factor not present during the earlier deposition. 
    Finally, defendants' failure to inform the tax court 
of Jeanette's release from the hospital, while improper, does not 
show that taxpayers were deliberately creating an excuse to avoid 
having Jeanette testify.  Jeanette was discharged against medical 
advice,  JA 225, and if taxpayers had really been attempting to 
deceive the court, they would have had Jeanette stay in the 
hospital until the conclusion of the trial. 
 Thus, in the face of contrary opinions by two experts 
who had significant opportunity to examine Jeanette, the tax 
court's explanation for its finding that Jeanette's "refusal to 
testify was a manipulation, and not a bona fide response to 
medical problems," JA 29, was extremely thin.  Moreover, it seems 
extremely unlikely that Jeanette was attempting to manipulate the 
trial process given that she had very little to gain by doing so 
-- there is little reason to believe that her testimony would 
have substantially aided the Commissioner; rather, it might have 
significantly hurt the Commissioner.  For example, based on our 
viewing of the deposition, we find Jeanette's testimony as to the 
$380,000 cash hoard quite straightforward, and it seems to be 
credible.  Finally, we note that even if Jeanette initially went 
to the hospital partly as an attempt to avoid testifying and 
helping the Commissioner, after receiving medical advice, she had 
every reason to worry about testifying.   
 
 
 Similarly, Jeanette's co-defendants, the representative 
of the Estate of Leon Spear and ultimately of Jeanette's 
children, had every reason to worry about the effect that 
testifying would have on her.  Thus, it is highly unlikely that 
taxpayers' refusal to allow Jeanette to testify was based solely 
on an attempt to manipulate the trial process and did not reflect 
significant concern for her health.  Compounding the problem is 
the fact that the tax court declined to hold a hearing on the 
issue because such a hearing would allegedly have disrupted the 
trial schedule.  Yet taxpayers offered to produce Dr. Durkin at 
the time when this would not disrupt the trial.  Especially in 
the absence of a hearing at which the tax court could ask Dr. 
Durkin why he was sure that Jeanette was not making up her 
illness or at least its severity, the tax court's finding of bad 
faith is seriously problematic.   
 We acknowledge that taxpayer was not prevented from 
complying with the court's order due to an external constraint.  
Even if Jeanette truly feared becoming more sick if she 
testified, she still was physically capable of testifying and 
consciously chose not to do so.  In this sense, her non-
compliance was willful.  Moreover, it was a choice that she made 
rather than a choice her attorney made.  Nonetheless, we think 
that Jeanette's level of culpability was not high, given that we 
have found that her fears of testifying were legitimate.6   
                     
     6  The tax court may also have based its decision to 
sanction the defendants on the fact that Jeanette did not go 
through with the second court ordered physical and mental 
examination, in the fall of 1991.  (T.C. Mem. Op. at 34-35).  But 
 
 
 We review the tax court's finding of bad faith and 
wilfulness deferentially, i.e., for clear error.  See 
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1960); B.B, 
Rider Corp. v. Commissioner, 725 F.2d 945, 948 (3d Cir. 1984); 
DeCavalcante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir. 1980).  A 
finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 
(1948).  While we understand the tax court's annoyance with Mrs. 
Spear, for the reasons we have elaborated on at such length, we 
are left with such a firm conviction here.  But even if the 
problematic bad faith finding survives because of deferential 
review (and if it did, it would be only by a small margin), the 
result would be the same because, under the sliding scale, the 
bad faith will have to be quite high to tip the balance in favor 
of the IRS in view of the fact that the other factors in the 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland-based test we apply strongly favor the 
taxpayer, see infra at 32-35, and it is not.   
 
 3)  The Need to Show Prejudice  
                                                                  
the IRS only asked for this examination when Jeanette refused to 
submit to a videotaped deposition.  After Jeanette did submit, 
the IRS withdrew its motion for sanctions.  Thus, the Spears had 
little reason to believe that she was still required to submit to 
such an examination, and hence meaning her refusal to do so 
cannot reasonably be deemed willful and in bad faith.   
 
 
 In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Court held that "the 
sanction must be specifically related to the particular `claim' 
which was at issue in the order to provide discovery." 456 U.S. 
at 707, 102 S. Ct. at 2107.  It may be that this requirement does 
not inherently bar sanctions where there is no prejudice.  
Arguably a sanction may be considered to be "specifically related 
to the particular `claim'" at issue in the discovery order even 
when there is little indication that the discovery would have 
produced useful information.  A party should certainly not be 
able to gain a strategic advantage at trial by refusing to 
provide information it is required to provide and avoiding 
sanctions because the other side cannot demonstrate the 
importance of this information.  
 Nonetheless, the basic thrust of the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is that sanctions that effect the outcome of the 
trial should only be imposed in order to compensate for 
violations that may plausibly be thought likely to affect the 
outcome of the trial.   See Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, 
Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Even in those cases where it 
may be found that failure to produce results in the discovering 
party's case being jeopardized or prejudiced, it is the normal 
rule that the sanction must be no more severe than is necessary 
to prevent prejudice to the movant." (quotations omitted)).7  And 
                     
     7 Cf. Betz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 816, 823 (1988) (where 
government delay in filing a brief caused no prejudice, the court 
would not deem certain facts true as a sanction); Meyers v. 
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(reversing the exclusion of the witnesses' testimony where the 
failure to include the witnesses in the pretrial memoranda was 
 
 
so we conclude that the imposition of any sanction that affects 
the likely outcome of a trial requires that the party sanctioned 
have gained some advantage from his or her disobedience of a 
court order.  In other words, the party that gains from the 
sanction must have been at least arguably prejudiced by the 
misconduct of the other side. 
 4) Was There Prejudice? 
 While the deposition was palpably an emotional 
experience for Jeanette, and she broke down and cried several 
times, her deposition was lucid and informative.  As we viewed 
the deposition, she possessed and was able to and did relate, in 
response to questions, a great deal of information about the 
affairs of the parking lot business.  There were also many things 
                                                                  
not a result of bad faith but of late discovery of the witnesses, 
the plaintiff informed the defendant of the discovery of the 
witnesses three weeks before trial thus minimizing prejudice, and 
the possibility existed of postponing the trial for a few days, 
conducting further discovery and taxing the costs to the 
plaintiff); De Marines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 
1193, 1202 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversing the exclusion of a witness' 
testimony where there was only a slight deviation from pre-trial 
notice requirements, and admitting the witness was likely to 
cause only slight prejudice to the defendants, who were already 
aware of the basic substance of the witness' testimony); United 
States v. Kincaid, 712 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983) ("Courts 
consistently have refused to impose sanctions when the government 
has destroyed evidence but the destruction did not prejudice the 
defendants."); Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Products, Inc., 605 F.2d 
426, 429  (9th Cir. 1979) (declining to award sanctions under 
Rule 56(g) which allows sanctions for affidavits submitted in bad 
faith, because no court had relied on the affidavit submitted); 
but cf. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1976) (dismissal must be 
available "not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be 
deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might 




that she did not know or remember, but it seems unlikely that, 
given that the events happened so many years ago, she would 
recall additional details at trial.  While Jeanette was quite 
deliberate, and sometimes stated that she did not understand what 
appeared to be simple questions (which were then repeated and 
answered), she was direct and composed.  She was apparently not 
feeling well physically (as well as emotionally), but, given the 
length of the deposition and the amount of detail covered, it is 
difficult to see how anything more would be forthcoming at a 
trial.    
 In our view, there was no prejudice to the IRS from 
Jeanette's failure to testify.  While the IRS stresses the need 
to obtain the truth, the fact is that the court received Mrs. 
Spear's 257-page (videotaped) deposition that we have described.  
What more did it need?  To repeat, having viewed the videotape, 
we cannot conceive what more the IRS could have adduced at trial.  
Moreover, Jeanette's testimony was favorable to the taxpayers 
rather than the government; thus, the only thing the government 
had a reasonable chance of gaining from her testimony was a hope 
to trip her up à la Perry Mason and diminish the credibility of 
taxpayers' evidence.  That rarely happens in the real world, and 
the Commissioner already had been presented with a chance to 
question Jeanette in a five hour deposition that occurred two 
months before trial during which defendants had very few 
objections to the questions posed by the Commissioner's counsel.  
The tax court thus had an excellent opportunity to judge 
Jeanette's credibility even without her appearance at trial. 
 
 
 Moreover, when the IRS requested the videotaped 
deposition, it did so in part because it was aware that Jeanette 
might not be available for trial and it marked the transcript for 
use at trial.  Thus, during the deposition, the IRS had every 
incentive to ask all the questions it wanted to ask at trial.  
The IRS did not explain what additional questions it had for 
Jeanette that she had not already answered during the deposition. 
 The IRS argues that there was prejudice because 
Jeanette was a "key witness in this case."  While Jeanette was a 
key witness, this does not explain why the IRS needed her live 
testimony.  Although live testimony is generally preferable to 
videotaped testimony, the absence of such testimony, even from a 
key witness, is only minimally prejudicial when that witness is 
adverse and when there is a videotaped deposition that can be 
introduced in lieu of live testimony.  That videotaped deposition 
testimony is a staple of modern case management in federal courts 
is too well established to require citation.  And yet, as 
taxpayers contend, "[e]ssentially, the IRS claims that it was 
crucial to have Jeanette testify for a second time so that she 
would not be believed."  (Appellant's Reply at 19).  But that, we 
have noted, is no basis for a conclusion of prejudice. 
 
  5)  The Balancing Exercise.  In view of the 
foregoing discussion, the balancing exercise is not difficult.  
We have concluded that the IRS incurred no prejudice, in view of 
the availability of the videotaped deposition.  On the subject of 
whether lesser sanctions would have been effective, this does not 
 
 
seem to be a factor here.  Although a finding of bad faith may 
not be strictly necessary to support sanctions, see Ins. Corp. of 
Ireland, 456 U.S. at 707, 102 S. Ct. at 2107; Hammond Parking Co. 
v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350-51, 29 S. Ct. 370, 380 (1908); 
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 905 
(3d Cir. 1977), the imposition of sanctions in the absence of bad 
faith generally requires a strong showing of prejudice.  But 
whatever rationale the tax court judge might have had, there 
certainly were lesser sanctions than were employed here that 
could have "sent the message."  Finally, we have concluded that 
the tax court's finding that Jeanette's failure to appear for 
trial was in bad faith is clearly erroneous, but that, even if 
not, it was sufficiently marginal that it would have been 
outweighed by the other factors which strongly militated in favor 
of the taxpayers' position.  Hence, on the sliding scale the 
result is the same.  Accordingly, the sanction constituted an 
abuse of discretion and must be set aside.   
  
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 We have concluded that the sanction imposed by the tax 
court, of deeming admitted the facts that furnished the predicate 
for use of the net worth method, and shifting the burden of proof 
on both net worth and fraud from the IRS to the taxpayer, 
constituted an abuse of discretion and must be set aside.  We 
will therefore vacate the decision of the tax court and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
The court may, of course, elect to retry the case.  In that 
 
 
event, it might be well advised to rely upon Jeanette's 
videotaped deposition in lieu of her testimony, although perhaps 
her emotional state is now better.  On the other hand, the court 
may simply prefer to decide the case on the basis of the existing 
record, but absent the "deeming" and its consequences which we 
have declared invalid.8   
 
  
                     
     8.  At all events, the tax court will have to address a 
number of interesting and difficult questions pertaining to the 
net worth method and its application to this case, which we have 
not had to reach in view of our disposition. 
